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Abstract: In a context where sustainable consumption and production need to be encouraged,
economic experiments can provide significant insights into how individuals consider environmental
externalities in their choices and how public policy can foster the environmental public good.
Experimental studies aiming to evaluate market mitigation of externalities through the provision of
green goods usually choose to adopt neutral language in terms of framing. Our study implements
an incentivized economics experiment to explore how supply and demand consider negative
externalities. Furthermore, the study addresses the impact of using non-abstract wording when
describing negative externalities. Two types of goods can be produced and bought, namely goods
generating negative externalities on other consumers (either labelled as B or brown) and goods that
cause no harm to others (either labelled A or green). We conclude that the provision of green goods
increases from 18.1% in the abstract frame to 70% in the environmental frame. Framing is, therefore,
a relevant variable for the outcome of this experimental market. This has important implications
for economic experiments aiming to evaluate pro-environmental behaviours and provide policy
orientations for the provision of green goods.
Keywords: laboratory experiments; framing effect; abstract instructions; green goods; public goods;
external validity; pro-environmental behaviour
1. Introduction
Sustainable consumption and production are challenges to be tackled within the broad debate
about promoting more sustainable choices in markets. Standard economic theory identifies externalities
in production as a market failure that can be corrected by regulators through the price mechanism [1,2].
Alternatively, if consumers care about the negative impacts on the environment caused by their choices,
they may also make more pro-environmental choices of consumption and, thus, lead to the voluntary
internalization of externalities. One mechanism for this is to choose green goods, which produce
lower environmental damage. Economic experiments can contribute to exploring the potential of
green goods to minimize environmental externalities and can provide significant insights into how
individuals consider environmental externalities in their choices and how public policy can foster the
environmental public good.
Green goods, within the framework of Lancaster’s theory of value [3], combine attributes from
private goods, but also public good attributes corresponding to lower externalities [4,5]. To promote
sustainability, public policy can, thus, aim to make choices by consumers greener in general and
foster green consumption through green goods and eco-labels [6,7]. There are nowadays several
examples of green goods or services, which generate less environmental damage at some stage of the
production process or throughout the life-cycle of goods. For example in France and in the U.K., several
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energy providers offer the option of electricity produced from 100% renewable energy sources [8,9].
Organic farming uses less polluting production methods and is growing steadily on the demand and
supply side in terms of different food items [10]. Some services also offer greener options such as
carbon-neutral flights which offset carbon emissions from flying [11].
For green goods to be a solution to externalities, consumers need to care for the wellbeing of
others who are potentially impacted by their less environmentally friendly consumption choices.
There is empirical evidence concerning the demand for green goods and ethical goods in general,
and, in particular, in surveys, respondents express support for environmentally friendly alternatives.
For example, the European-wide survey of public opinion reports that 89% of respondents agree that
“buying environmentally-friendly products can make a difference to the environment” [12]. However,
when looking at actual behavior, there is what has been called an attitude–behaviour gap or green gap
(e.g., [13–15]). Actual purchases make green goods still part of a niche market. In Europe, only one
fifth to one quarter of respondents indicated that they actually bought green goods in the previous
month [12,16].
Economic experiments have been widely designed and implemented to study different aspects
of prosocial behaviour and can, thus, provide a controlled framework to explore actual behaviours
when it comes to choices with negative impacts on others. Incentivized choices made in economic
experiments mean that participants face a monetary cost to engage in prosocial behaviour. Therefore,
the exploration of prosocial and pro-environmental consumption choices can greatly benefit from the
randomized control afforded by economic experiments, as well as the monetarily incentivized nature
of the choices made. This paper reports on an experiment where consumers and firms interact in a
market where goods can cause negative externalities on consumers, or not, depending on consumption
and production choices. This is a market where green goods are possible. Within this setup we explore
to what extent market participants care about negative externalities due to their choices and if green
goods can be a solution to the externality market failure.
While some economic experiments have been designed to study the potential of green goods and
ethical goods markets and institutional arrangements to reduce the externality market failure [17–21],
the setup for these experiments is devoid of environmental context. Considering the potential interest
and relevance of experimental results for green goods markets for policy design, using neutral language
for the instructions may then raise questions about external validity, as context-free experimental
markets are quite different from what participants would find in real context markets for green goods.
Alekseev, Charness, and Gneezy [22] argued that when the social aspect of decisions is relevant,
opting for an abstract frame does not allow subjects to take into account in their decisions’ social
considerations that they would otherwise.
In the present paper, we design two treatments which differ in terms of framing. If we want to
argue that economic experiments can help assess the potential of market participants on both sides to
internalize externalities and contribute to the environmental public good, we need to test how framing
impacts experimental results. Only then, can researchers use experimental setups to test policy designs.
The current paper presents a laboratory experiment for a market where both green (non-polluting)
and brown (polluting) goods may be traded, depending on consumers’ and producers’ preferences,
and compare results when a neutral or an environmental frame are used. In theory, if economic
agents care about the negative externalities of their choices, then the framing should not matter for
experimental market outcomes and how experimental subjects make choices. However, if framing is
itself consequential, then it should be acknowledged as a variable.
A brief discussion of framing in economic experiments is presented in Section 2. This contributes
to identifying the value added by the paper in terms of the literature on framing within economic
experiments. The experimental framework and procedures of our study are presented in Section 3 and
the results obtained are described in Section 4. The last section of the paper discusses the implications
of our experimental results and conclusions.
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2. Framing within Economic Experiments
Smith’s [23] recommendation for avoiding introducing realism in laboratory experimental
instructions to guarantee experimenter control has been truly incorporated in the majority of economic
experiments since then. Framing itself did not represent a variable of interest under traditional
neoclassical models, only the incentives provided by the institutions under study mattered. As a
consequence, the use of neutral language and context-free designs continue to be a gold standard for
laboratory experiments in economics.
However, several studies have explored framing as a treatment variable and questioned where it
is in fact innocuous. Tversky and Kahneman [24,25], for instance, highlighted the fact that, although a
rational decision should not change because of its framing, the truth is that if the same problem is set
in a different perspective, it might influence subjects’ decision. These authors presented a variety of
preference reversals examples from their experiments, depending on the framing of acts, contingencies,
or outcomes.
Vernon Smith himself has questioned his own premise about the context irrelevance assumption
for economic experiments. Smith [26] inferred that subjects participating in neutral language
experiments necessarily create their own context for the structure being presented, which is different
from individual to individual and based on their own personal past experience. Context variation in
ultimatum and dictator games as cited by Smith [26] may vary the experimental results significantly.
This goes in line with one of the arguments used by Levitt and List [27] to criticize laboratory
experiments in economics and advocate the use of field experiments, at least to complement results
obtained in the laboratory. These authors considered that the particular context and process by which
a decision is embedded is as important for human decisions as their monetary payoff, and not totally
controlled by the experimenter. Harrison and List [28] had already used similar arguments in favor of
field instead of laboratory experiments, considering that introducing participants to neutral context
experiments could result in less rather than more control of the experiment. Results from Engel and
Rand [29] for Prisoner’s Dilemma laboratory experiments corroborated this argument. The authors
concluded that subjects construct their own mental model, even when neutral language is used during
the experimental sessions to make participants focus their attention on the payoff structure.
Other experimental studies tested the impact of using different instructions framing, for various
settings and purposes. Alekseev et al. ([22], p. 49) conducted a selective analysis of experimental
economics papers where contextual instructions are manipulated, noting however they “did not
attempt to cover every existing paper that systematically varies context in economics studies” but
rather “provide a summary that illustrates the main usages of context and its effect on participants’
behaviour over a wide range of scenarios”. They concluded that there is no “one case fits all”, as some
experimental studies see their results affected by the use of a different language whereas others not.
Alekseev et al. [22] concluded that the appropriateness of using neutral language depends on the goal
of each study but highlight that the impact of instructions’ framing should be recognized.
However, Alekseev et al. [22] also mentioned that for cases where the social aspect is
important, not using a language close to reality may jeopardize laboratory experiments’ validity
and interest, because neutral language does not allow subjects to take into account in their decisions
social considerations that they would otherwise. This conclusion is corroborated by laboratory
experiments that had an environmental problem as a motivation (as is the case of those run by Cason
and Raymond [30], Cookson [31], Pevnitskaya and Ryvkin [32], and Raymond and Cason [33]).
These authors considered the framing of instructions as a research variable and found it to be
statistically significant, leading to individuals’ shifts in preferences. Under a theory of framing,
subjects’ preferences related to the methods used to measure or observe them.
Previous experimental studies aiming to study the efficiency of the market for goods generating
externalities or not (brown and green goods, respectively) used mainly neutral language and a setup
devoid of an environmental context. This type of option aims to reduce influences in decisions
due to complex or emotionally charged terminology, rather than the incentives associated with the
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payoff structure, outlined by Holt [34]. Bartling et al. [18], for instance, used the term “unfair” and
“fair” to refer to the goods causing or not an externality, respectively, which may not be considered
neutral language. However, as framing was not their research variable these authors did not test
if the results would differ using a more neutral language in the instructions. Furthermore, other
economic experiments, as is the case of Etilé and Teyssier [35], Rode, Hogarth and Le Menestrel [36],
and Valente [37], explored the potential role of ethical goods in markets to promote prosocial behaviour
but did not test the impact of framing on the results.
Considering the potential interest and relevance of experimental results for green goods markets
for policy indications, using neutral language for the instructions may then raise questions about
their external validity. Our paper, thus, fills a gap in the experimental economics literature on
pro-environmental behaviour in that it explicitly tests the effects of framing and wording and how this
conditions the conclusions that can be used for policy design purposes. The current paper presents a
laboratory experiment for a market where both green (non-polluting) and brown (polluting) goods may
be traded, depending on preferences of market participants, and compares the results when a neutral
or an environmental frame is used, such as classifying goods as “A” or “B” versus “green” or “brown”
respectively. This means we are not considering the framing cases Cartwright [38] commented on but
simply turning the usual aseptic environment of the laboratory experiments into a more realistic one.
The current paper intends to contribute to this discussion about the influence of framing on
laboratory experiments results. Our experimental design allows us to evaluate whether individuals’
prosocial preferences in relation to externalities vary when using neutral versus non-neutral language
in the instructions. This goes in line with Harrison and List [28] recommendation for using abstract
and less abstract instructions in laboratory experiments to evaluate if context could make a difference
for the market outcome. By exclusively varying the wording of the instructions (Complete version of
the instructions for both treatments in Appendixs A and B), i.e., the labelling of the goods being traded
in the market, and maintaining all the economic variables and payoff structure, our research variable is
precisely the context of the experiment presented to participants. Having one experimental treatment
with a more abstract setting concerning externalities and another employing a context-rich language,
we contribute with additional evidence and arguments for the theory of framing. Additionally, given
the focus on the selling and purchase of goods that can generate externalities or not, we enrich the
debate about the potential limitations and contributions for policy design from abstract and context-free
vs. framed experiments about green goods.
3. Experimental Framework and Procedures
A laboratory market was implemented where two types of goods were available, one that
causes negative externalities (on other players) and another that does not. Our experimental setting
represented a posted-offer market where the type of good proposed by firms was truthfully revealed,
so actual externalities imposed were also known with certainty at the end of each period (round) in the
market. Two experimental treatments were run, to evaluate participants’ social preferences and if these
vary under different framing: the NEUTRAL FRAME and the ENVIRONMENTAL FRAME treatments.
All else being equal, the two experimental settings differed in the labelling of goods being traded,
and in the manner the externality was presented to participants in the instructions, as illustrated on the
excerpt of Table 1. Goods were referred to as A and B for the NEUTRAL FRAME or green and brown
for the ENVIRONMENTAL FRAME treatment. Furthermore, in the ENVIRONMENTAL FRAME
treatment, the environment was explicitly mentioned and the negative externality presented as a
negative impact on other players and akin to a negative impact on the environment. In the NEUTRAL
FRAME, the negative externality was only presented as causing a negative impact on others. In both
cases, the difference between the two goods was presented in terms of different production costs and
the imposition (or not) of external costs on others.
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Table 1. Instructions about the rules of the market in the two experimental treatments.
Neutral Frame
In each market, in each period, fictitious goods will be traded. There are two types of goods available to be
produced, Type A and Type B. Each producer will choose one type, propose a price and will be able to sell up
to three units. Each buyer decides from whom to buy one unit.
There are two types of goods which differ in their production costs and the fact that during production they
may cause negative impacts on the earnings of buyers in the group:
Type A: is more costly to produce (50 points) but does not cause any negative impact on buyers;
Type B: is less costly to produce (40 points) but if a buyer chooses it, it causes a negative impact on the
earnings of the other two buyers in the group (10 points each).
Environmental Frame
In each market, in each period, fictitious goods will be traded. There are two types of goods available to be
produced, Green Goods and Brown Goods. Each producer will choose one type, propose a price and will be
able to sell up to three units. Each buyer decides from whom to buy one unit.
The two types of goods in this market have identical characteristics, in terms of quality and performance,
therefore, are worth the same for consumers. However, the two goods differ in their production costs because
of the technology used: either cleaner and more expensive technologies or polluting and cheaper techniques.
Brown Goods are cheaper to produce but impact negatively on the environment through pollution and waste
generation, which in turn has a negative effect on other individuals in society (due to health problems caused
by pollution, for instance, or the adverse effects caused by the loss of environmental quality). For that reason,
in this experiment, when a Brown Good is purchased, the earnings of the other buyers in a group are
negatively affected. Green goods have higher production costs, but since they do not harm the environment,
there is no negative impact on the other buyers in the group.
Green Good: is more costly to produce (50 points) but does not cause any negative impact on the
environment neither on other buyers;
Brown Good: is less costly to produce (40 points) but if a buyer chooses it, it causes a negative impact on the
environment and on the earnings of the other two buyers in the group (10 points each).
Parameters used in the market with six participants (three buyers and three sellers) are
summarized in Table 2. Buyers buy at most one unit per period and receive the same payoff (100) for
either a green (A) or brown (B) good bought. Thus, we opted for homegrown rather than induced
preferences, as the same value was given to green (A) and brown (B) goods. A different valuation for
these goods depended on the utility from causing no externality on others. This procedure has been
adopted in several experimental treatments to evaluate the existence of social preferences in buyer and
seller markets [18,35–37].
Table 2. Parameters for the green (A) and brown (B) goods (in experimental units).
Parameters Green (A) Brown (B)
(−) production cost 50 40
(−) externalities 0 20
(+) benefit 100 100
(=) net social benefit 50 40
Additionally, buyers could choose from which producer to purchase their good and were aware
that whenever a unit of a brown (B) good was purchased a negative externality of 20 was caused,
implying a 10 points loss on each of the other two buyers in the market, in both treatments.
Sellers could end up supplying all the units being demanded in the market, although they can
only produce one type of good in each period, either green (A) or brown (B). A competitive market
was implemented, where sellers were free to propose goods that differ in their type and price and were
able to offer all units being demanded in the market. Therefore, buyers were not forced to accept a less
attractive offer due to supply restrictions (and were free not to buy at all).
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When a seller sold a unit, it incurred a production cost of 50 (experimental points) for a green (A)
good or 40 if the good is brown, and no costs were incurred if he did not sell. At the beginning of the
experiment, firms were given 400 experimental points, whereas buyers were given 20 experimental
points in each round. While this was equivalent in terms of payoffs, buyers were assured an income in
each round even if they chose not to make a purchase. Parameters are summarized in Table 2.
Both treatments represented a market with twenty rounds including three sequential stages in
each round. In stage 1, firms chose to produce A or B and set the price. In stage 2, buyers saw the
proposals from the three firms and decided from whom to purchase one unit or whether not to make
a purchase. In stage 3, participants were informed about the choices and all transactions made in
the market. At the end of the twenty rounds actual payoffs, including externalities, were calculated
and a summary display revealed to all participants. Experimental points were then converted at a
conversion rate of 100 experimental points = £1.75 and earnings were privately announced.
Experimental sessions for the treatment NEUTRAL FRAME and ENVIRONMENTAL FRAME
were run in February and June 2015, at the Experimental Economics Laboratory of Royal Holloway,
University of London (U.K.) using Z-tree [39]. Eighty-four subjects took part (Table 3) in the study,
and each subject participated in one treatment only in a fixed group (three sellers and three buyers)
and fixed role.
Table 3. Sessions overview.
Treatments # Groups or Markets # Subjects # Sellers # Buyers
NEUTRAL FRAME 2 sessions × 4 groups 48 24 24
ENVIRONMENTAL FRAME 2 sessions × 3 groups 36 18 18
Total 14 84 42 42
The usual protocol and procedures for laboratory experiments were respected [40]. Each experimental
session started with a private reading of the instructions by all participants for both roles, an oral summary
of the instructions and some practice questions to verify if all instructions were understood. Only after the
actual experiment began, were participants informed of the role (randomly determined) they would
play for twenty rounds.
A short questionnaire was also filled in by each participant at the end of the twenty-round
market experiment, concerning the participant socioeconomic background and questions about
environmental and ethical consumption choices (including a question based on the Eurobarometer [16]
about engagement in environmentally motivated actions).
Sessions lasted approximately one hour and thirty minutes and subjects earned on average £14.66,
which were paid immediately at the end of the session.
4. Results
In this section we present the experimental results obtained in the two treatments and explore how
the framing of the experiment impacts market outcomes. We then focus on the supply and demand
sides of the market. These results help us understand whether in a market where green goods coexist
with brown goods, the voluntary internalization of negative (environmental) externalities is possible
and how widespread it is.
4.1. Market Outcomes
We started by presenting the share of green and brown goods traded in the market (Table 4),
for pooled market/period observations and then disaggregated this data and analyzed sellers’
announcements per period and per market (Figures 1–3). Prices paid for goods being traded in
the market were also analyzed for both treatments, as well as profits of sellers and buyers.
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Table 4. Share of green (A) goods in proposals and purchases.
Treatment Proposals Market Share
NEUTRAL FRAME 31.9% 18.1%
ENVIRONMENTAL FRAME 68.9% 70.0%
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Figure 2. Announcements of green goods in NEUTRAL FRAME Treatment, per period and market.
In the NEUTRAL FRAME treatment, 31.9% of the 480 producer proposals were for green goods
while the remainder was for brown goods. As for the ENVIRONMENTAL FRAME treatment,
only 31.1% of the producer proposals were for brown goods, whereas 68.9% of the announcements
were for green goods in this treatment. It is clear, therefore, the existence of a statistically significant
difference between the announcements of green goods in each market per period in NEUTRAL
FRAME and ENVIRONMENTAL FRAME treatments, confirmed by the non-parametric rank–sum test
(Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney test z = −8.534, p = 0.0000; please note that all WMW tests are for pooled
market/period observations).
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Figure 3. Announcements of green goods in ENVIRONMENTAL FRAME treatment, per period
and market.
As Figure 1 illustrates, the number of sellers announcing green goods is always higher in the
ENVIRONMENTAL FRAME treatment than in the NEUTRAL FRAME treatment. This difference
is even more salient if we recall that the number of groups participating in the ENVIRONMENTAL
FRAME treatment (six) was smaller than in the NEUTRAL FRAME treatment (eight) and, consequently,
the maximum green announcements in the former was less than in the latter (eighteen versus
twenty-four). Figure 1b illustrates that difference in relative terms. On the other hand, there are
clear differences in Period 1 already.
Looking at the disaggregated data on sellers’ announcements per group (market) and per period
(Figures 2 and 3) it is clear again the difference between the two treatments. In the ENVIRONMENTAL
FRAME treatment there were several periods with the three sellers in the group announcing green
(on period 2, for instance, five out of the six groups announce only green), whereas in the NEUTRAL
FRAME treatment the opposite situation occurs, with no green goods being offered in several
groups (on period 4, six out of the eight groups announce only brown). This means that in
those periods/groups buyers would either buy nothing or they were forced to buy green in the
ENVIRONMENTAL FRAME treatment and brown in the NEUTRAL FRAME treatment, as those were
the unique type of goods being offered.
Turning now to the number of green units effectively sold, the difference between treatments,
was even higher, with only 18.1% of market share for green goods in the NEUTRAL FRAME treatment
against 70% in the ENVIRONMENTAL FRAME treatment (Table 4), which is a clear and statistically
significant difference (Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney test z = −9.907, p < 0.01).
In terms of mean prices paid for green and brown goods in both treatments, these were similar
for brown goods, but in the ENVIRONMENTAL FRAME treatment, mean price paid for green goods
was higher than in the NEUTRAL FRAME treatment (Table 5). The latter is a statistically significant
difference confirmed by the non-parametric rank–sum test (Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney test z = −3.906,
p < 0.01), while using the same statistical test we confirm that there are no statistically significant
differences between the prices paid for brown goods in the two treatments (Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney
test z = −1.318, p = 0.1874).
Although both green and brown goods have the same private value for consumers, buyers were
paying a price premium for green goods in both treatments, as there is a statistically significant
difference between the price paid for green and brown goods (Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney test z =
12.614 and z = 14.013, p < 0.01 for NEUTRAL FRAME treatment and ENVIRONMENTAL FRAME,
respectively). However, this price premium does not translate to higher profit for sellers who sell
Games 2018, 9, 70 9 of 18
green goods neither in the NEUTRAL FRAME nor in the ENVIRONMENTAL FRAME treatment.
When comparing firms’ profits for green and brown goods we conclude there is no statistical significant
difference in the ENVIRONMENTAL FRAME treatment (Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney test z = 0.618, p =
0.5368) and for the NEUTRAL FRAME treatment the difference is statistically significant but with
the opposite signal, which means sellers earn less when selling greens than when selling browns
(Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney test z = −4.760, p = 0.0000). This is because the price premium buyers are
paying to buy green, in the NEUTRAL FRAME treatment, is not enough to cover the higher costs of
producing green (+10 experimental points) instead of brown (price premium= mean price of green
goods–mean price of brown goods = 53.3 − 44.2 = 9.1).
Table 5. Prices paid for green and brown goods in both treatments.
PRICE GREEN GOODS N Mean sd Min. Max.
neutral frame 87 53.3 4.3867 45 70
environmental frame 252 55.7 5.7568 44 80
PRICE BROWN GOODS N Mean sd Min. Max.
neutral frame 390 44.2 5.6504 20 65
environmental frame 106 44.3 4.9810 15 70
Sellers’ and buyers’ earnings are statistically significantly different in the two treatments. Sellers’
earnings are higher in the ENVIRONMENTAL FRAME treatment (Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney test z =
2.325, p < 0.05) but for buyers the opposite occurs, with earnings higher in the NEUTRAL FRAME
than in the ENVIRONMENTAL FRAME, as confirmed by the two-sample Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney
rank–sum test (z = 13.018, p = 0000). However, also in both treatments, buyers’ profits are different for
the two types of goods, with earnings from the purchase of brown goods higher than those with the
purchase of green goods (Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney test z = 21.786, p = 0000). Results are confirmed,
and the conclusion remains if running this test separately for each treatment (z = 12.413 and z = 13.564,
p = 0000 for the NEUTRAL FRAME and the ENVIRONMENTAL FRAME treatments, respectively).
Considering the differences just mentioned in the two experimental treatments on the market
share, price paid, or buyers’ profits for the green goods, we will now look to the behaviour of both
sides of the market separately, to try to identify potential reasons for the different prosocial preferences
either for firms or consumers.
4.2. Supply Side Behaviour
Starting with the supply side of the market, we now compare the probability of a firm selling
any good in both treatments. We consider the impact of the sellers’ own proposed price, how the
proposed price compares relative to the lowest price in the market (lowest competitors’ price), whether
the proposed good is green (green good proposed) and the reputation effect. As it was possible for
buyers to follow the behaviour of each of the sellers throughout the 20 periods of the session (because
they were paired into fixed groups, as mentioned before), we consider the possibility of reputation
effects to emerge. For that, we computed how the sum of the times a seller proposed a green good in
the market up to a certain period (own reputation) related to the reputation of the greenest competitor
in terms of proposals (variable relative green reputation). A positive relative green reputation means
the seller announced green goods more often than competitors, whereas a negative value implies that
at least one other seller in the market has a greener reputation. Table 6 presents the results from a
panel data Logit model that regresses the probability of selling in a particular period on this relative
reputation measure. We included in the regression also sellers’ own proposed price, how the proposed
price compares relative to the lowest price in the market (variable lowest competitors’ price) and whether
the proposed good is green (variable green good proposed). A dummy variable was also created for all
those components, to evaluate the treatment effect on the probability of selling at least one unit.
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Table 6. Panel data Logit model for the probability of seller selling at least one unit.
VARIABLES
Proposed price −0.334 ***
(0.0371)
Proposed Price * Environmental Frame 0.221 ***
(0.0416)
Lowest competitors’ price 0.331 ***
(0.0368)
Lowest Competitors’ Price * Environmental Frame −0.292 ***
(0.0404)
Green good proposed (1: yes 0: no) 0.965 ***
(0.358)
Green good proposed * Environmental Frame 0.168
(0.491)
Relative green reputation 0.175 ***
(0.0470)
Relative Green Reputation * Environmental Frame −0.0903
(0.0642)
Environmental Frame (1: yes 0: no) 2.828 *
(1.578)
Constant 1.003
(1.209)
Observations 840
Number of subjects 42
Notes: dependent variable: dummy variable for seller selling or not in a given period; variable Environmental Frame
is 1 in the ENVIRONMENTAL FRAME treatment and 0 in the NEUTRAL FRAME treatment; robust standard errors
in parentheses; levels of statistical significance: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
According to Table 6, the probability of selling in a given period depends, as expected, negatively
on the price proposed and positively on the competitors’ price, for both experimental treatments.
Additionally, proposing a green good and having proposed more green goods than competitors up
to a particular period (relative green reputation) increases the probability of selling in that period.
When considering the treatment effect, however, we conclude that in the ENVIRONMENTAL FRAME
treatment buyers are not as sensitive to price as in the NEUTRAL FRAME treatment. On the other
hand, proposing a green good in the market and having a positive relative green reputation increases
the probability of selling in both treatments, although for the ENVIRONMENTAL FRAME treatment
the former is more relevant than the later. Finally, as we can see from the ENVIRONMENTAL FRAME
dummy variable, the probability of selling at least one unit is greater for the firms in treatment
ENVIRONMENTAL FRAME than in the NEUTRAL FRAME treatment.
Considering the fact that offering green goods in the market increased firms’ probability of selling
and that for the ENVIRONMENTAL FRAME treatment greens proposals are much higher than in the
NEUTRAL FRAME treatment (as illustrated in Figures 1–3), we tested for the probability of different
green announcements to depend differently of the environmental consciousness of sellers in both
treatments. For that, we created an indicator variable (variable Environmental Consciousness) from
three questions that were part of the questionnaire at the end of the experiment. These questions
were based on the Eurobarometer [16] about engagement in environmentally motivated actions.
The question is formulated as follows “Have you done any of the following activities during the past
month for environmental reasons” with yes/no responses and includes the following behaviours:
“separated most of my waste for recycling”; “Cut down my energy consumption (e.g., turning down
air-conditioning or heating, not leaving appliances on stand-by, buying energy saving light bulbs)”,
and “reduced the consumption of disposable items (plastic bags, certain kind of packaging, etc.)”.
A subject was classified as environmentally conscious if they indicated to have engaged in the past
month in three actions for environmental reasons.
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As we can see from Table 7, the probability of announcing green in the market does not depend on
the environmental consciousness of the sellers in the experiments, but the probability of announcing
green is higher in the ENVIRONMENTAL FRAME, as we had already concluded. Therefore, it is not
subjects’ characteristics that explain the different behaviour registered on the supply side of the market
in both treatments but the different context under which their decisions were made.
Table 7. Panel data Logit model for the probability of announcing green goods.
VARIABLES Green Announcements
Environmental Consciousness (1: yes 0: no) 0.577
(0.505)
Environmental Consciousness * Environmental Frame 0.142
(1.195)
Environmental Frame (1: yes 0: no) 1.792 *
(1.041)
Constant −1.201 ***
(0.357)
Observations 840
Number of subjects 42
Notes: dependent variable: dummy variable for seller announcing or not a green good in a given period;
independent variables: variable Environmental Consciousness is 1 if individual has performed three actions in
the past month for environmental reasons, 0 otherwise; variable Environmental Frame is 1 in the ENVIRONMENTAL
FRAME treatment and 0 in the NEUTRAL FRAME treatment; robust standard errors in parentheses; levels of
statistical significance: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
4.3. Demand Side Behaviour
On the demand side of the market we have already identified the existence of prosocial
preferences in both experimental treatments because, as we have seen before (Table 5), consumers pay
a price premium for green goods, even if they have exactly the same private value as brown goods
(100 experimental points). We now analyse the probability of buying green goods considering their
availability in the market (sellers’ announcements for green), price as well as the price of brown goods,
the number of green units bought by the other consumers in the previous market, and control for the
impact of subjects’ environmental consciousness and treatment effect. Results for a random effects
logit regression of green choice is presented in Table 8.
Table 8. Panel data Logit model for the probability of buying green.
VARIABLES
Number of sellers announcing green 0.470
(0.352)
Green units bought by other consumers (lagged) 0.236
(0.219)
Lowest price for green good −0.216 ***
(0.0593)
Lowest price for brown good 0.239 ***
(0.0581)
Environmental consciousness 1.228
(0.928)
Environmental Frame 2.898 ***
(1.115)
Constant −2.460
(2.452)
Observations 435
Number of subjects 42
Notes: dependent variable: dummy variable for buyers buying or not a green good in a given period; Robust
standard errors in parentheses; levels of statistical significance: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p <0.1.
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As it becomes clear from results in Table 8, choosing green goods does not depend on the greenness
of the market announcements neither on subjects’ environmental consciousness. Additionally,
behaviour of the other buyers in the market in previous periods in terms of green goods purchased it
is not relevant for subjects’ choices. The probability of buying green depends only on the price being
charged for green and brown goods and on the experimental treatment. In the ENVIRONMENTAL
FRAME treatment, the probability of choosing green is higher than in the NEUTRAL FRAME treatment.
5. Discussion and Conclusions
The present economic experiment addresses negative externalities associated with market
decisions of production and consumption. In the two experimental treatments, a negative externality
is similarly parametrized in terms of payoff impacts but is differently presented in terms of framing
and context in the instructions. The results indicate that the context presented to participants in the
laboratory experiment, through instructions wording, matters and influences subjects’ behaviour.
The market output in the two experimental treatments was statistically significantly different,
with a result much closer to the social optimum (all greens outcome) under the ENVIRONMENTAL
FRAME treatment than with the NEUTRAL FRAME treatment. This result was the consequence of
varying exclusively the context presented to participants. The NEUTRAL FRAME treatment used
neutral language to present the market for green and brown goods, calling them A and B, respectively,
and the ENVIRONMENTAL FRAME treatment labelled the goods precisely as green and brown.
Besides the difference in the labelling of goods in these two treatments, the negative externality was
also presented differently to participants: As a negative impact to the other buyers in the market in
both experimental treatments, but in the ENVIRONMENTAL FRAME treatment subjects were told that
brown goods harms the environment, which is why other consumers in the experiment are harmed.
In the ENVIRONMENTAL FRAME treatment, both the intention (announcements) of selling
green goods and the green goods effectively traded in the market were higher than in the NEUTRAL
FRAME treatment. Buyers paid a price premium for green goods in both treatments, but this was
smaller than the additional cost of production in the NEUTRAL FRAME. In fact, buyers’ earnings were
higher in the NEUTRAL FRAME than in the ENVIRONMENTAL FRAME, which seems to indicate
that when the negative externality is presented as also having a negative impact on the environment,
a more altruistic behaviour arises, and subjects give up some of their earnings in favor of a social
(environmental) cause. Consequently, more green units were sold in the market, with a higher price
premium, which represented a higher profit for sellers in the ENVIRONMENTAL FRAME treatment.
The present work aimed at contributing to the ongoing methodological discussion about the usual
procedure of using neutral framing in economic experiments, as currently, this is not a consensual
option, in particular in what concerns prosocial behaviour. This study adds arguments to the literature
that considers framing as a relevant research variable for experimental studies, as the market outcome
we obtained was sensitive to the introduction of a more realistic experimental context, revealing a
significant influence of the wording used to describe the experiment. The question now is if this is
something undesirable and should be avoided in experimental studies about environmental questions
or, on the contrary, an indication that neutral language is not appropriate for this type of study.
According to Alekseev et al. [22], for external validity purposes and environmental policy
guidance, laboratory experiments aiming to evaluate prosocial behaviour should not use neutral
framing. Following this argument, if the objective is to evaluate voluntary approaches to solve
environmental problems given their public good nature, by voluntarily internalizing negative
externalities, subjects’ behaviour in the laboratory under a context-rich environment would certainly
be closer to the one in the field. Therefore, economic experiments using non-abstract contexts can be
more realistic and informative than if an abstract frame is used.
However, when analyzing the results from the present experiment more thoroughly, we argue
that some caution should be taken in this kind of generalization, in particular when designing
laboratory experiments to test issues related with green markets or other environmental matters.
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In the context-rich treatment, ENVIRONMENTAL FRAME, results show strong prosocial preferences
and behaviours, which we interpret as “too green” to be real when compared to real-life consumption
decisions. As with Pevnitskaya and Ryvkin [32], we conclude that including an environmental context
in the experiment results in a higher manifestation of preferences for externality reduction than under
a neutral context treatment.
When confronting the results with empirical evidence, the NEUTRAL FRAME results are more
in line with real market shares for green goods. In fact, in spite of widespread support in surveys
for pro-environmental consumption choices, actual purchases make green goods still part of a niche
market [14]. As a consequence, a more realist setup in terms of results to explore the potential of green
goods to promote the environmental public good is to use more neutral language. Going back to the
original recommendation by Smith [23], in this case, abandoning the neutral frame leads to much
“rosier” conclusions as to the potential internalization of externalities through green consumerism.
This can lead to an overestimation of the potential of supply and demand to promote the public good.
Therefore, Smith’s [23] recommendation to use more abstract or neutral wording in the instructions
should remain in practice if laboratory results are supposed to serve for policy guidance about
real market outcomes for green goods and have external validity. Subjects’ behaviour is different
when evoking environmental impacts, with much more prosocial behaviour within the experiment,
than when the wording only evokes the damage done to other experimental participants. It should,
however, be noted that it does not necessarily follow from this experiment that other experiments
involving environmental matters should opt for an abstract frame. We can speculate that for
issues involving prosocial behaviour, which is sensitive to experimental context effects [41], a more
abstract frame can provide more realistic results, but do not claim to generalize this to other
environmental issues.
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Appendix A. Instructions for Treatment NEUTRAL FRAME
Welcome to the experiment
You can earn money in this experiment and the amount that you earn depends on your choices and
those of the other participants.
Read these instructions carefully and if you have any questions, please raise your hand and wait for
the experimenter to come to your seat. Do not talk during this experiment with anyone other than
the experimenter.
Today’s session has 4 Parts:
Part 1 (Instructions):
You are given paper instructions to read and a short oral summary will be made by the experimenter.
You will be asked to answer a few questions to check you understood the instructions.
Part 2 (Experiment):
A market experiment that has 20 periods.
Part 3 (Questionnaire):
Once all participants have finished, there will be a short questionnaire about you and today’s session.
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Part 4 (Earnings):
After the questionnaire, the experimenter conducting today’s session will pay you in private the
earnings from the decisions you’ve made, in cash. The currency unit in this experiment will be in
points and at the end of the session points will be converted to pounds (£) at the following exchange
rate: 100 points = £1.75.
You will be asked to sign a receipt for your earnings. Please remain seated for this to ensure privacy.
All the decisions you make and your earnings will be private and anonymous.
What is this experiment about?
At the beginning of today’s experiment each participant will be assigned a role: Buyer or Producer.
The roles will remain the same throughout the experiment. Each participant will make their decisions
in a group of 3 Producers and 3 Buyers, which will remain fixed throughout the session. Since all your
decisions are anonymous, you will not learn with whom you interacted today.
Rules of the market experiment
In each market, in each period, fictitious goods will be traded. There are two types of goods available
to be produced, Type A and Type B. Each producer will choose one type, propose a price and will be
able to sell up to three units. Each buyer decides from whom to buy one unit.
There are two types of goods which differ in their production costs and the fact that during production
they may cause negative impacts on the earnings of buyers in the group:
Type A: is more costly to produce (50 points) but does not cause any negative impact on buyers;
Type B: is less costly to produce (40 points) but if a buyer chooses it, it causes a negative impact on the
earnings of the other two buyers in the group (10 points each).
Procedure for this experiment in each period:
Each group is formed of Producers 1, 2 and 3 and Buyers 1, 2 and 3.
1- Producers announce their price and product type
Producers can choose from two types of goods when making their proposals.
In the beginning of each period, each Producer announces:
-the type of good (A or B)
-the price (s)he will charge per unit sold (this can be any integer from 0 to 110)
These are proposals, and only if buyers agree to buy, do they become effective in terms of earnings,
production costs, prices and negative impact on buyers.
2- Buyer makes an order
The Buyer learns the price and type for each Producer in his/her group. The Buyer can order 1 unit
and decides from which Producer to buy.
The Buyer can choose not to buy a unit in any given period.
3- Earnings are calculated by the computer:
The computer receives the orders of the buyer and executes the production accordingly.
At the end of each period, earnings for the Producers and Buyers are calculated, according to the
following rules:
Producers:
• If a Producer does not sell anything, his earnings for that period are Zero.
• If a Producer sells something, he receives the unit price minus the production cost per unit sold.
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This is multiplied by the number of units sold (which can be 1, 2 or 3). The maximum price a Producer
can announce is 110 points.
Earnings of a Producer = (Price − Production cost) * Number of units of the good sold
At the beginning of the experiment each Producer will be given a fixed amount of 400 points. Any
gains or losses the Producer makes per period are added or subtracted to this amount.
Buyers:
At the beginning of each period, each Buyer will be given a fixed amount of 20 points (corresponding
to a total of 400 points).
In each period, one unit of good the buyer buys is worth 100 points to him/ her.
• If buyer buys one unit:
Earnings = 20 points + 100 points − price paid − negative impact caused by purchases of other buyers*
• If buyer does not buy one unit:
Earnings = 20 points − negative impact caused by purchases of other buyers*
* If other buyers buy Type B goods.
At the end of today’s experiment, the earnings from the 20 periods are summed and converted
into pounds.
Before you proceed to the experiment, please let the experimenter know you have read the instructions,
by raising your hand.
You will be asked to answer some quick questions to check if the instructions were clear to you.
Appendix B. Instructions for Treatment ENVIRONMENTAL FRAME
Welcome to the experiment
You can earn money in this experiment and the amount that you earn depends on your choices and
those of the other participants.
Read these instructions carefully and if you have any questions, please raise your hand and wait for
the experimenter to come to your seat. Do not talk during this experiment with anyone other than
the experimenter.
Today’s session has 4 Parts:
Part 1 (Instructions):
You are given paper instructions to read and a short oral summary will be made by the experimenter.
You will be asked to answer a few questions to check you understood the instructions.
Part 2 (Experiment):
A market experiment that has 20 periods.
Part 3 (Questionnaire):
Once all participants have finished, there will be a short questionnaire about you and today’s session.
Part 4 (Earnings):
After the questionnaire, the experimenter conducting today’s session will pay you in private the
earnings from the decisions you’ve made, in cash. The currency unit in this experiment will be in
points and at the end of the session points will be converted to pounds (£) at the following exchange rate:
100 points = £1.75.
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You will be asked to sign a receipt for your earnings. Please remain seated for this to ensure privacy.
All the decisions you make and your earnings will be private and anonymous.
What is this experiment about?
At the beginning of today’s experiment each participant will be assigned a role: Buyer or Producer.
The roles will remain the same throughout the experiment. Each participant will make their decisions
in a group of 3 Producers and 3 Buyers, which will remain fixed throughout the session. Since all your
decisions are anonymous, you will not learn with whom you interacted today.
Rules of the market experiment
In each market, in each period, fictitious goods will be traded. There are two types of goods available
to be produced, Green Goods and Brown Goods. Each producer will choose one type, propose a price
and will be able to sell up to three units. Each buyer decides from whom to buy one unit.
The two types of goods in this market have identical characteristics, in terms of quality and
performance, therefore are worth the same for consumers. However, the two goods differ in their
production costs because of the technology used: either cleaner and more expensive technologies or
polluting and cheaper techniques. Brown Goods are cheaper to produce but impact negatively the
environment through pollution and waste generation, which in turn has a negative effect on other
individuals in society (due to health problems caused by pollution, for instance, or the adverse effects
caused by the loss of environmental quality). For that reason, in this experiment, when a Brown Good
is purchased, the earnings of the other buyers in a group are negatively affected. Green goods have
higher production costs, but since they do not harm the environment, there is no negative impact on
the other buyers in the group.
Procedure for this experiment in each period:
Each group is formed of Producers 1, 2 and 3 and Buyers 1, 2 and 3.
1- Producers announce their price and product type
Producers can choose from two types of goods when making their proposals.
In the beginning of each period, each Producer announces:
-the type of good (Green or Brown)
-the price (s)he will charge per unit sold (this can be any integer from 0 to 110)
These are proposals, and only if buyers agree to buy, do they become effective in terms of earnings,
production costs, prices and negative impact on the environment and on buyers.
2- Buyer makes an order
The Buyer learns the price and type for each Producer in his/her group. The Buyer can order 1 unit
and decides from which Producer to buy.
The Buyer can choose not to buy a unit in any given period.
3- Earnings are calculated by the computer:
The computer receives the orders of the buyer and executes the production accordingly.
At the end of each period, earnings for the Producers and Buyers are calculated, according to the
following rules:
Producers:
• If a Producer does not sell anything, his earnings for that period are Zero.
• If a Producer sells something, he receives the unit price minus the production cost per unit sold.
This is multiplied by the number of units sold (which can be 1, 2 or 3). The maximum price a Producer
can announce is 110 points.
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Earnings of a Producer = (Price − Production cost) * Number of units of the good sold
At the beginning of the experiment each Producer will be given a fixed amount of 400 points. Any
gains or losses the Producer makes per period are added or subtracted to this amount.
Buyers:
At the beginning of each period, each Buyer will be given a fixed amount of 20 points (corresponding
to a total of 400 points).
In each period, one unit of good the buyer buys is worth 100 points to him/ her.
• If buyer buys one unit:
Earnings = 20 points + 100 points− price paid− negative impact caused by purchases of other buyers*.
• If buyer does not buy one unit:
Earnings = 20 points − negative impact caused by purchases of other buyers*.
* If other buyers buy Brown goods, the buyer knows for sure how much impact the purchases have on
his/her payments (−10 points per unit)—this information is revealed at the end of each period.
At the end of today’s experiment, the earnings from the 20 periods are summed and converted
into pounds.
Before you proceed to the experiment, please let the experimenter know you have read the instructions,
by raising your hand.
You will be asked to answer some quick questions to check if the instructions were clear to you.
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